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Abstract Norman Daniels’s theory of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ is an
influential conception of fairness in healthcare resource allocation. Although it is
widely thought that this theory provides a consistent extension of John Rawls’s
general conception of justice, this paper shows that accountability for reasonable-
ness has important points of contact with both utilitarianism and intuitionism, the
main targets of Rawls’s argument. My aim is to demonstrate that its overlap with
utilitarianism and intuitionism leaves accountability for reasonableness open to
damaging critiques. The important role that utilitarian-like cost-effectiveness cal-
culations are allowed to play in resource allocation processes disregards the sepa-
rateness of persons and is seriously unfair towards individuals whose interests are
sacrificed for the sake of groups. Furthermore, the function played by intuitions in
settling frequent value conflicts opens the door for sheer custom and vested interests
to steer decision-making.
Keywords Healthcare resource allocation  Accountability for reasonableness 
Public justification  Norman Daniels  John Rawls
Norman Daniels is a key theorist in the field of justice and health. In particular, his
account of fair process in healthcare resource allocation, which constitutes the main
focus of my argument, is highly influential also beyond theoretical debates. It has
been used as a guide to policy-making on multiple occasions by, for example, the
British NHS, the Mexican government and the WHO.1
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1 For the NHS, see NICE [17]. For Mexico and the WHO, see Daniels [4, pp. 274–296].
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Daniels’s account of fair process, called ‘accountability for reasonableness’
(AFR), is the subject of much critical debate [1, 7, 9, 12, 24]. However, no
commentator appears to take issue with Daniels’s [4, pp. 29–30] belief that his
theory constitutes an extension of John Rawls’s hugely influential general theory of
justice into the realm of health. In fact, much work in this area starts from the
assumption that, like the rest of Daniels’s theory, AFR provides a faithful translation
of Rawls’s account [7, 24].
This paper aims to demonstrate that AFR is vulnerable to important arguments
advanced by Rawls. However, its interest is not limited to those who start from a
commitment to Rawls’s theory of justice. Besides playing a fundamental role in
Rawls’s account, the arguments that I intend to draw on are compelling in their own
right and very relevant to healthcare resource allocation. My goal is to build upon
these arguments to develop an original critique of AFR.
After reconstructing AFR, I draw on Rawls to argue that Daniels’s failure to keep
a safe distance from both intuitionism and the aggregative logic of utilitarianism
severely damages his theory of fairness in healthcare resource allocation. Next, I
briefly outline a future research direction that could be explored in attempting to
revise AFR, namely a shift towards a different form of public justification
liberalism.
Daniels’s Model of Fair Process
AFR is connected with Daniels’s analysis of the value of health. Daniels believes
that health protects a person’s range of opportunities to pursue life plans. Rawls’s
theory, along with several competing accounts of justice, provides reasons to protect
opportunities and distribute them in an egalitarian fashion. Given that healthcare
protects health, Daniels [4, pp. 29–78] maintains that healthcare should be regarded
as special, which means that societies should provide universal access to it, in
isolation from ability to pay and other social goods.
As important as the specialness of healthcare may be when it comes to organising
healthcare systems at a general level, Daniels recognises that no principle of
opportunity, Rawlsian or otherwise, is fine-grained enough to provide answers to the
specific substantive questions that make up the routine of healthcare resource
allocation agencies. Numerous substantive criteria are generally considered to be
suitable for governing the allocation of scarce healthcare resources, while available
theories of opportunity are too abstract to determine how these criteria should be
traded off against each other when they conflict. Daniels lists three particularly
important conflicts as representative of all others. How much priority for the sickest
is justified vis-a`-vis the production of greater aggregate health benefits? When
should significant health benefits to a smaller number of persons be outweighed by
the aggregation of more modest benefits to a larger number of persons? How should
the value of a fair chance to derive some benefit from available resources be
balanced against more cost-effective interventions? From the perspective of
available theories of opportunity, a wide range of possible answers to each of
these questions appear equally just [4, pp. 103–110].
2 Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16
123
To solve these conflicts, the principle of opportunity needs to be supplemented.
Drawing on Rawls’s notion of pure procedural justice, Daniels claims that resource
allocation decisions should be regarded as just when they result from a fair decision-
making process, where fairness must be understood in terms of the four conditions
constituting AFR:
• Publicity: Decisions and supporting rationales must be transparently stated.
• Relevance: ‘The rationales for limit-setting decisions should aim to provide a
reasonable explanation of how the organization seeks to provide ‘‘value for
money’’ in meeting the varied health needs of a defined population’. An
explanation is reasonable if it is grounded in considerations that can be accepted
as relevant by persons who are willing to provide justifications for the allocation
of resources they support.
• Revision and appeals: Mechanisms must be in place to challenge decisions.
• Regulation: There must be uniform enforcement of the other three conditions.2
Relevance, which is supposed to constrain the substance of the reasoning leading to
decisions, is the primary target of this paper’s criticism. Relevance is very inclusive
towards the substantive criteria that may be proposed as suitable for governing
resource allocation. Indeed, a wide variety of criteria can be considered to have at
least some relevance to the pursuit of some unspecified ‘value for money’ in
meeting health needs. This leads to decision-makers adopting long lists of relevant
criteria, as reflected in the practice of those real-world resource allocation agencies
that apply AFR.
Consider the British National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE),
which not only endorses AFR, but is also typically described by Daniels [5,
pp. 178–180] as a successful application of AFR’s key ideas. Founded in 1999 and
operating at arm’s length from the Department of Health, NICE provides guidance
in a number of areas, but is most often discussed for its compulsory recommen-
dations on the coverage of pharmaceuticals and other health technologies in the
NHS. Over time, NICE has progressively introduced a number of so-called ‘equity
weightings’ to be balanced against the cost-effectiveness of health technologies to
decide whether they should be funded.
To be sure, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) still plays a uniquely important
role in NICE’s process, in that equity weightings are only considered when the cost-
effectiveness of a technology falls below a certain mark and, therefore, NICE needs
reasons other than cost-effectiveness to justify a positive recommendation; beneath
an even lower mark, the support provided by the equity weightings must be
exceptionally strong for that technology to be funded despite its poor cost-
effectiveness. Still, when the conditions are right, decision-makers can appeal to
severity of disease, the potential for innovation of the technology under appraisal,
stakeholder persuasion, the premium placed on benefits accruing to patients at the
end of their lives, the extra priority for the members of disadvantaged groups and
the special attention to be paid to children [17, 20]. In a recent consultation paper,
2 Daniels [4, pp. 117–133, while the direct quotation of the relevance condition is from page 118, with
emphasis in the original]. AFR draws on the work that Daniels has carried out with Sabin [5].
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NICE [18] proposes that the wider societal benefits of technologies should be added
to the list, and it is hard to see why this proposed criterion (and many others that
could have been suggested with it) should be excluded if the question is merely one
of relevance to the pursuit of value for money in meeting health needs.
To prepare the ground for my critique of Daniels, it is important to discuss CEA
in greater detail. CEA is an aggregative criterion in that it combines the health gains
and losses of different individuals into the health gain and loss of a group as a
whole; its basic idea is that decision-makers should allocate available funds so as to
create the greatest sum total of health benefits aggregated across the population.
Health benefits are generally measured in terms of quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs), which integrate life expectancy and health-related quality of life. To see
how efficiently a certain intervention can foster the maximisation of aggregate
benefits in the context of a limited budget, the cost of the intervention is divided by
the number of QALYs that would be created by it. This gives the cost of the
intervention per QALY added to the health of the population; the lower the cost per
QALY, the greater the cost-effectiveness of an intervention [2, pp. 53–78].
Cost-per-QALY estimates for interventions are widely used, generally in
conjunction with other criteria, to determine which interventions should and should
not be funded. Daniels [4, p. 114] makes it clear that the three conflict cases, noted
above, that he uses to justify AFR demonstrate that ‘CEA by itself cannot serve as a
decision procedure’ for allocating healthcare resources. However, the exposition of
his theory of AFR attaches great importance to cost-effectiveness—perhaps greater
importance than that attached to any other relevant criterion. To see how, let us go
back to the three conflict cases.
Although priority to the sickest, the premium placed on individual ability to
benefit from intervention and the provision of fair chances may well clash with each
other, none of Daniels’s conflict cases pits two of these quintessentially distributive
considerations against one another. Each of Daniels’s cases, which are paradigmatic
examples of the conflicts that AFR is meant to arbitrate, opposes the aggregative
and maximising logic of CEA against a different consideration that stresses the
importance of who receives the benefits. This suggests that an implicit assumption
underlying AFR is that resource allocation processes have two high-order goals,
which must be balanced: the maximisation of aggregate population health and the
distribution of benefits fairly.3 Given that cost-effectiveness is one and the same as
the former goal, virtually all the other relevant considerations are grouped together
under the latter goal, highlighting an asymmetry between CEA and any other
relevant criterion in the theory behind AFR.
As further support to the claim that CEA is not simply a relevant consideration
among others, it is important to recall that Daniels defines the relevance condition as
relevance to the goal of creating value for money. Given CEA’s commitment to
creating as much good as possible from the money available for healthcare, the
notion of value for money is commonly associated with CEA, to the point that this
3 An explicit reference to the conflict between maximisation and distribution is sometimes used by
Daniels to frame the problems facing the application of AFR to real-world resource allocation. For
example, see Daniels [4, pp. 253–254 and 303–304].
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notion is sometimes almost reduced to cost-effectiveness [17, p. 4]. Again, it
appears that the theory behind AFR has a particularly close link with the idea of
cost-effectiveness.
Two Problems with Aggregation
My reconstruction depicts AFR as a conception of fair process in which decision-
makers must allocate resources on the basis of cost-effectiveness calculations
balanced against a wide variety of relevant countervailing considerations. In the
introduction, we saw that Daniels and his commentators seem to agree that AFR
works well as a supplement to Rawls’s general theory of justice. My critique of AFR
is prompted by the sense that they are missing something important.
Rawls [22, pp. xvii–xviii] clearly states that the main aim of his theory is to put
forward a superior alternative to the only approaches to the allocation of societal
resources that philosophers deemed viable in the 1960s, namely utilitarianism,
intuitionism and, most appealing of all, a mix of them in which the principle of
utility is restricted by intuitionistic constraints. This aim is grounded in compelling
arguments against utilitarianism and intuitionism. My goal in this section and the
next is to demonstrate that these arguments can be used to show that AFR is a
flawed account of fairness in healthcare resource allocation. Indeed, when Rawls’s
arguments are adapted to the case of AFR, it will emerge that Daniels’s model looks
much like the mixed approach that Rawls wishes to find an alternative to.
Consider first Rawls’s [22, pp. 19–30] argument against utilitarianism, which is
the general view that societal resources should be allocated so as to maximise the
sum total of satisfaction aggregated throughout all members of society. Rawls’s
argument can be thought of as consisting of two closely connected parts. To start
with, Rawls argues that utilitarian institutions violate the separateness of persons. A
single individual is free to impose a loss on herself in order to secure a greater gain,
perhaps at a later date. However, utilitarianism requires that the losses imposed on
certain individuals should be freely balanced against the gains accrued to others,
therefore treating society as though it was a single person, produced through the
conglomeration of all its members.
Given that CEA requires that the health losses to some be balanced against the
health gains to others so as to maximise aggregated health benefits, CEA is affected
by the same problem. Insofar as decision-makers employ CEA, the health gain and
health loss of a social conglomerate influence resource allocation decisions in their
own right, effectively making such a conglomerate into a somewhat monstrous
independent unit of concern, above and beyond the concern due to individual
members of society.
Also the second part of Rawls’s argument targets an element that utilitarianism
shares with CEA, namely the exclusive concern for the maximisation of aggregated
benefits, as opposed to their distribution. If either utilitarianism or CEA plays any
role in allocating limited resources, there will be cases in which decision-makers
assign priority to giving a smaller benefit to each member of a larger group over a
larger benefit to each member of a smaller group. The larger the role either
Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16 5
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utilitarianism or CEA is allowed to play, the greater the sacrifices that individuals
from the smaller group will be required to make in these sorts of conflict cases.
According to Rawls, it is highly problematic to require that individuals make
important sacrifices specifically for the sake of a group, as opposed to making
important sacrifices because one or more other individuals have a stronger claim to
available resources. The problem is the violation of the compelling idea, derived
from the social contract tradition, that a just society is ultimately built on equal
respect and concern for individuals, who enjoy a form of inviolability by the claims
of groups as such.
A supporter of CEA could try to deflect my criticism by objecting that
utilitarianism and similarly aggregative views are actually built on a separate
concern for each person. As claimed by Hirose [10], this commitment to the
separateness of persons is reflected in the principle that the well-being of everyone
should count for one and no more than one for the purposes of the utilitarian
calculus.4 It is unclear to me how the principle that the well-being of everyone
should count for one in an interpersonally aggregative calculus expresses a
commitment not only to impartiality between competing interests, but also to the
separateness of persons, especially in the relevant moral sense of treating them as
separate ultimate units of concern. Hirose [10, p. 196] anticipates this reaction, and
he briefly comments that impartiality logically implies separateness; utilitarianism
cannot be impartial between the well-being of Annie and Betty ‘unless it
acknowledges the fact that Annie and Betty live different lives’.
However, this alleged logical relation linking impartiality between interests with
the separateness of persons does not withstand scrutiny. A person can accept for
herself a principle of rational choice requiring that the satisfaction of each of her
interests should count for one (regardless, for example, of whether they qualify as
higher or lower pleasures in a Millian sense) without transforming them into
interests that, instead of all being part of her life plan, belong to different persons—
and, moving close to the moral understanding of separateness, without taking the
satisfaction of any of her interests to enjoy an inviolability that cannot be
outweighed by any aggregation of other individually weaker interests of hers.
How damaging to Daniels is this Rawlsian-inspired twofold critique of CEA?
The section ‘Daniels’s Model of Fair Process’ explained that when presenting his
theory of AFR, Daniels frames his arguments in a way that effectively gives a place
of honour to the idea of cost-effectiveness. This already demonstrates Daniels’s
failure to fully appreciate the strength of Rawls’s arguments against utilitarianism
and their relevance to CEA. However, this is by no means all that can be said
against Daniels. AFR also imposes too few constraints on the extent to which CEA
can govern the practice of resource allocation, therefore condoning seriously unfair
decision-making processes.
To be sure, I noted earlier that Daniels rejects the view that CEA should serve by
itself as a decision procedure. However, AFR does not exclude processes for
allocating resources that assign a high, albeit not absolute, priority to cost-
effectiveness in its conflicts with distributive considerations. To give a concrete
4 See also Norcross [19, pp. 79–80].
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example of such processes, we saw that Daniels typically depicts NICE as a
successful application of AFR’s key ideas, despite the especially important role that,
as mentioned in the section ‘Daniels’s Model of Fair Process’, CEA plays in
NICE’s procedures.
Consequently, AFR condones processes that are seriously flawed (according to
the Rawlsian line of thought that I have developed in this section) by virtue of the
large use of CEA they make and, therefore, by virtue of the great extent to which
they are affected by the two problems with the aggregative logic of CEA. Indeed, if
a resource allocation process decides in favour of cost-effectiveness in a wide range
of conflict cases with the various countervailing considerations, (1) a great deal of
the reasoning at the core of such a process is defective because it is built upon a
misguided unit of concern, and (2) the process is seriously unfair towards those
potential beneficiaries who are now required to sacrifice considerable individual
claims simply for the sake of a group.
As a last defence of AFR, one might distinguish AFR itself (strictly understood
as the framework made up of the core notions of publicity, relevance, revision and
appeals, and enforcement) from the way in which Daniels presents and develops it.
Next, it might be suggested that in itself, AFR is not necessarily vulnerable to my
Rawlsian-inspired arguments against cost-effectiveness, in that CEA could simply
be excluded as irrelevant to healthcare resource allocation based precisely on
Rawls’s objections to aggregation. My response to this ingenious way of moving
beyond Daniels is that it stretches the concept of relevance too thin. The problems
with aggregation identified by Rawls are not problems of irrelevance to the pursuit
of value for money in the allocation of scarce resources. Therefore, the notion of
relevance is simply ill-suited to narrowly constrain the use of cost-effectiveness. In
turn, this means that AFR should be replaced by an account of fair process that has
the necessary resources to impose stricter constraints on CEA, so as to exclude the
serious instances of unfairness overlooked by AFR. To identify another weakness in
this model, let us now discuss Rawls’s argument against intuitionism.
The Case Against Intuitionism
According to Rawls’s definition, intuitionists believe that (a) a plurality of
irreducible substantive values apply to political issues and (b) there is no explicit
principle for weighing such values against each other. Why is this approach called
‘intuitionism’? If a plurality of values apply to political issues, they will often
conflict with one another. Given that there is no explicit principle for balancing
values in all conflict cases or, at least, confining intractable value conflicts within
narrow limits, intuitions are bound to greatly influence decision-making by
determining how conflicts must be settled.
Rawls points out that intuitionism is particularly tempting when the focus is on
specific public policy areas such as fair wages and—we may add—healthcare
resource allocation. I argue that AFR yields to this temptation, effectively proposing
an account of fair process in which cost-effectiveness is intuitively balanced against
a plurality of other substantive criteria. The section ‘Daniels’s Model of Fair
Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16 7
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Process’ established the link between Daniels’s relevance condition and long lists of
criteria. Moreover, Daniels’s case for AFR demonstrates that, according to him,
explicit principles for weighing those criteria against each other are unavailable; we
need AFR precisely because available theories of opportunity cannot explain how to
balance CEA against the numerous other criteria that appear to be suitable for
governing resource allocation. Consequently, decision-makers following AFR are
bound to make frequent use of intuitions when cost-effectiveness conflicts with
other relevant criteria.
What is the problem with the work done by intuitions in settling value conflicts?
Intuitions are opaque in the sense that a person cannot be expected to satisfactorily
explain to others why her intuitions favour one possible solution to a value conflict
over others. Hence, Rawls [22, pp. 30–36] maintains that vested interests and sheer
custom are free to hide behind intuitive judgements to determine the solutions to
value conflicts in a way that is virtually impossible to detect. The risk is that sheer
power and status-quo bias hijack decision-making without even being detected.
Rawls’s argument against intuitionism is particularly relevant to healthcare
resource allocation decisions because of the context in which such decisions are
made. This context, which I will now briefly discuss, makes it all the more likely
that the use of an intuitionistic approach such as AFR ends up serving as a
smokescreen for status-quo bias and, more importantly, for vested interests to steer
the decision-making. This result violates the very notion of fairness that Daniels
wishes to place at the basis of AFR, namely fair process as a transparent exchange
of reasons in the search for resource allocation arrangements that truly guarantee
value for money spent.
Agencies responsible for allocating healthcare resources are on the receiving end
of a huge amount of pressure exerted by multiple lobbies. To cite but a few
examples, the enormous lobbying power of pharmaceutical industries is always at
work to loosen the constraints on drug coverage that resource allocation agencies
impose in the attempt to stay within their budgets. The interests of Big Pharma
generally converge with the interests of patient advocacy groups, while the media
constitute another important actor, which has traditionally been keen to launch
campaigns against resource allocation efforts. On top of all this, elected politicians
often have incentives to side with such lobbies. In sum, as claimed by Williams
et al. [30, p. 90], ‘the interplay of interest group agendas is nowhere more significant
than in healthcare’.5
As an example of the pressure exerted by lobbies, consider the case of Herceptin
in the UK. As explained by Ferner and McDowell [6, p. 1269], Herceptin well
exemplifies the ability of pharmaceutical companies to make the general public
attuned to a promotional message about a drug long before licencing, through
enthusiastic press releases and exhortations to spread the word, delivered as soon as
positive results start to emerge from early trials. In 2005, the drug had been used for
a few years to treat advanced breast cancer under the NHS, and pressure mounted on
the NHS after positive results in the treatment of early-stage breast cancer had
started surfacing. Newspapers published numerous stories, attacking what was
5 See also Goddard et al. [8].
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depicted as red tape that was denying many women access to a wonder treatment.
Patient advocacy groups did their part, with one of them marching on Downing
Street in September 2005 to submit a petition.
Local commissioning authorities, at the time called ‘primary care trusts’ (PCTs),
were ultimately responsible for choosing whether NHS providers in their area
should start offering Herceptin to early-stage breast cancer sufferers. At that stage,
the European Medical Agency had not yet received the necessary information to
assess the safety of Herceptin in the treatment of early-stage breast cancer in order
to issue a licence. Thus, PCTs were pressurised into making coverage decisions not
only before NICE could appraise value for money, but also before safety issues
could be assessed. Nonetheless, politicians went to great lengths to ensure that as
many PCTs as possible would cover Herceptin. In a Department of Health press
release, the Secretary of State for Health, Patricia Hewitt, declared that she wanted
to see Herceptin in widespread use. She went as far as to meet with the staff of one
of the PCTs that had upheld the principle that the licensing process should not be
bypassed—unsurprisingly, the decision taken by the PCT was reversed after the
meeting [6, 28, pp. 1–9].
We can now appreciate the full potential for damage that the intuitionistic
approach embedded in AFR is likely to inflict upon the fairness of healthcare
resource allocation processes. The Herceptin case is only a particularly egregious
example of the sort of pressure that, as encapsulated in the words of Williams and
colleagues, vested interests routinely put on resource allocation. If we accept that a
plurality of values apply to resource allocation and only intuitions can settle their
conflicts, decision-makers are offered the ‘easy’ option of giving in to that pressure
while also obfuscating the fact that vested interests are effectively governing the
decision-making.
Daniels himself stresses that a great deal of disagreement exists, among both
theorists and ordinary persons, about how to balance conflicting criteria for making
decisions and answer specific healthcare resource allocation questions; many
different orderings of criteria and many different decisions seem right to different
persons. Therefore, if we exclude strikingly implausible arrangements, decision-
makers following AFR often have the option of appealing to intuitions to justify an
ordering of conflicting criteria that leads to a decision that favours the most
powerful lobbies with an interest in the issue at hand. In sum, given the context in
which healthcare resource allocation takes place, the intuitionistic nature of AFR
creates a very high risk that powerful vested interests will steer decision-making
without even being detected, violating Daniels’s own idea of fairness as transparent
reason-giving by decision-makers in search of truly valuable resource allocation
arrangements.
It is important to pause a little longer over the intuitionistic character of AFR, to
forestall any misunderstanding of my argument. Readers might wonder whether my
argument only works because it has narrowly focused on relevance, apparently
forgetting about publicity and the other conditions of AFR. I have not forgotten
about them, and I believe that transparent reason-giving can help considerably in the
fight against status-quo bias and vested interests, as can be illustrated by going back
to the Herceptin case. It is hard to imagine any local commissioner openly declaring
Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16 9
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that they have decided to fund Herceptin because they wish to please the
pharmaceutical industry, or even because they simply want the Secretary of State
and pressure groups off their back. Among other things, these sorts of rationales
would have likely faced challenge had PCTs had any internal appeals process.
Therefore, AFR is better suited to curb the influence of status-quo bias and vested
interests than so-called systems of ‘implicit rationing’, where the processes through
which healthcare resources are allocated are not publicly acknowledged.
However, precisely because I appreciate the importance of publicity in the
justification of decisions, I believe that the intuitionistic character of AFR still
creates a problem. The frequent intractable value conflicts that, as we have seen,
AFR is meant to deal with create a space that is by its nature closed to transparent
reason-giving and, in turn, to the protection transparency offers against sheer
custom and vested interests. This feature of value conflicts that are taken to be
intractable to explicit principles has been stressed both by critics and proponents of
publicity. One of Mechanic’s [13, 14] argument for implicitly ‘muddling through’
healthcare resource allocation decisions is that, to strike the right balance among the
many considerations relevant to the problem at hand, decision-makers often have to
make judgement calls that, by their very nature, cannot be transparently explained to
others. At the other end of the spectrum, Richardson [23, pp. 287 and 305,
respectively] criticises intuitive balancing precisely because the grounds for
accepting a certain ordering of conflicting values as intuitive will always be
‘mysterious’ from the perspective of others, and will never be ‘open to rational
public debate’. It is through this opaque process for arbitrating value conflicts that
status-quo bias and vested interests risk creeping back, at least in some measure,
into decision-making procedures governed by AFR.
My discussion of Herceptin was meant to give a sense of the sheer amount of
pressure faced by healthcare resource allocation decision-makers—a pressure so
strong that it sometimes threatens the standing of resource allocation agencies in
society, if not their prospects for survival [25, p. 23]. It is against this background, I
reiterate, that we should assess the risks involved in AFR admitting long lists of
values into decision-making while acknowledging that many different orderings of
values and, therefore, many different resource allocation decisions seem right to
different persons. The need to intuitively balance conflicting values will often create
a chance for decision-makers to yield to that huge pressure by publicising as
intuitive to them the ordering of relevant values that leads to the decision favoured
by the most vocal or otherwise most powerful interest groups.
This problem constitutes a serious flaw in Daniels’s model. It is a problem that
might not be completely solvable; as acknowledged by Rawls, it is implausible to
completely eliminate intuitions from the process of adjudicating value conflicts.
However, it is important to find a way to make the problem associated with
intuitions less serious than it is under AFR by confining the use of intuitions within
narrower limits. As sketched in the next section, an option worth exploring is to
develop the notion of public justification beyond AFR’s conditions, in a way that
imposes a tighter frame of reasoning on decision-makers.
10 Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16
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What Next?
This paper has shown that AFR is vulnerable to powerful arguments originally
advanced by Rawls, leaving us with the task of developing a revised account of
fairness in resource allocation that does more to limit the role of CEA and confines
intuitions within narrower limits. This is an extremely complicated task, and I am
forced to leave its completion for another day. However, I wish to briefly sketch a
possible research direction that will be worth considering, perhaps among others,
when examining how to revise AFR.
AFR’s problems are due to the relevance condition, whose inclusivity leads to
long lists of criteria being admitted into decision-making and is hospitable towards
procedures that make extensive use of CEA. The other conditions help ease those
problems, at least regarding sheer custom and vested interests, but do not go far
enough. Therefore, although publicity, revision and appeals, and enforcement
should be retained, a fitting substitute should be found for relevance. Daniels
himself [3, pp. 201–202] points us in an interesting direction when he clarifies that
AFR incorporates a principle of universal acceptability among reasonable persons,
but only in the ‘attenuated’ sense that everyone must be able to see the relevance of
the rationales. He admits that there are ‘fuller’ conceptions of universal
acceptability, which seem a promising place to look for candidates for replacing
relevance.
A possible replacement, which embraces acceptability without strings attached,
requires that decision-makers strive to ground resource allocation decisions in
rationales that each reasonable person can accept, where reasonable persons are
understood to be those who are themselves committed to decisions that everyone
similarly motivated can accept. This requirement could be called the ‘full
acceptability condition’, and closely resembles classic formulations of the duty of
public justification for binding decisions,6 already brought to bear on issues of
distributive justice by Nagel [16]. Also, this requirement is virtually identical to
classic formulations of contractualism in the debate over the distribution of scarce
benefits, as exemplified, once again, by Nagel and also by Scanlon’s [27] idea that
decisions should be made according to principles that no one could reject in a
situation in which everyone is committed to proposing principles that no other
similarly motivated person could reject.
Thus far, I have only laid out the definition of the full acceptability condition. But
how do its requirements differ from those imposed by relevance on resource
allocation? Why is the full acceptability condition an option worth considering?
First, it would impose limits on the use of CEA well beyond those set by AFR.
Contractualists explain that when applied to the distribution of scarce benefits, the
requirement to look for arrangements that everyone can accept (or no one can reject)
imposes a rather specific and considerably tight frame of mind on decision-
makers—one that asks them to carry out pairwise comparisons between the
perspective of each potential beneficiary and that of every other, which in turn pull
6 This duty is most famously captured by the theory of public reason proposed by Rawls [21,
pp. 212–254].
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strongly towards a commitment to assigning priority according to the strength of the
claims to resources that potential recipients of intervention can make as individuals.
To see how this tight frame of reasoning is derived, recall that resource allocation
decisions are bound to create winners and losers. Nagel [15, p. 123] points out that
in these circumstances, no decision can be completely acceptable to everyone.
Therefore, decision-makers committed to universal acceptability have to settle for
the arrangement that is most acceptable to the person to whom it is least acceptable.
Nagel suggests that the decision that is most acceptable to those to whom it is least
acceptable should be identified through pairwise comparisons, with the aim of
identifying which member of each pair has stronger grounds for rejecting a resource
allocation arrangement that does not help her.7
What matters for the purposes of my argument is that, as contractualists make
clear, no interpersonal aggregation is part of this reasoning method. The basic idea
here is that aggregative and maximising principles can only satisfy acceptability to a
single point of view that combines all individual perspectives into one, while this
frame of reasoning aims for acceptability to each individual perspective.8
By themselves, AFR’s original conditions could not have imposed this tight non-
aggregative frame of reasoning. The section ‘Two Problems with Aggregation’
already explained that the notion of relevance is ill-suited to place strict constraints
on the use of aggregative principles. A similar point can also be made about
publicity as understood by AFR, i.e., as disclosure of decisions and supporting
rationales to the general public. It seems implausible to assume that the members of
the public who are concerned with healthcare resource allocation are generally
committed to the specific way of reasoning about it that involves placing oneself (at
least schematically) in the shoes of each potential beneficiary, in order to identify
who has the strongest claim to available resources. This commitment presupposes a
strongly altruistic attitude, which is a lot to expect, especially in an area of debate
where the members of certain patient groups have much to lose. Moreover, it
presupposes a very specific way of giving shape to that attitude—one concerned
with acceptability to each. Without any widespread and strongly-felt commitment of
this sort in the real world, it seems a stretch to suggest that by itself, transparency
could push decision-makers progressively closer to the anti-aggregative frame of
reasoning that is integral to the universal acceptability condition.
Now, although free from aggregation, the reasoning method that is imposed by
universal acceptability is usually proposed by contractualists as part of sophisticated
theories, which include arguments suggesting that such a method converges on the
same conclusions as CEA in certain cases where aggregative methods give
intuitively right answers. Most notably, the non-aggregative reasoning imposed by
the full acceptability condition is said to prioritise helping the greater number in
7 See also Nagel [16, pp. 63–74] and Scanlon [26, pp. 119–123].
8 Nagel [15, p. 86]. In the same passage, Nagel also rightly notes that a ‘schematic’ rendering of
individual claims, which can therefore be considered ‘in essentials’, would suffice. In the interest of
practicality (and without involving any interpersonal aggregation), it would therefore be admissible to
create, for example, a prioritised list that ranks healthcare interventions based on the strength of the
claims that typical individual members of different patient groups can make to them, ignoring certain
differences among individual members of the same group or sub-group of patients.
12 Health Care Anal (2018) 26:1–16
123
conflict cases between differently-sized groups of otherwise similar potential
beneficiaries [27, pp. 231–235; and 11, pp. 48–77]. Also, given that it seems fair to
say that the strength of an individual’s claim depends in part on the extent to which
she could benefit from intervention [15, p. 125; and 26, p. 123], non-aggregative
reasoning appears to have an answer to the so-called ‘bottomless-pit problem’,
posed by patients who are extremely badly-off, but only capable of receiving trivial
benefits.
Moreover, the theories behind non-aggregative reasoning are sometimes so
sophisticated as to argue that there are specific circumstances in which non-
aggregative reasoning itself requires passing matters on to CEA or other aggregative
methods, as in conflict cases between a smaller group of potential beneficiaries and
a larger group with claims that, although weaker, are strong enough to remain
relevant. Building on previous work by Kamm, Voorhoeve [29] argues that in these
cases, non-aggregative reasoning cannot identify any arrangement that every
reasonable person can accept, therefore abdicating the matter to aggregative
reasoning. If considered together with the instances of convergence, would this
limited role for CEA allowed by full acceptability be enough to create a plausible
account of resource allocation? If not, would minor adjustments be sufficient? Also,
are the arguments highlighting convergence with and a role for cost-effectiveness
solid? These are some of the questions that a full evaluation of the full acceptability
condition would have to tackle. On the face of it, however, this condition seems
promising precisely because the problematic logic of aggregation would be much
more rigidly constrained than under AFR.
The second reason why the full acceptability condition deserves attention
concerns intuitions. We have just seen how precisely the reasoning method required
by full acceptability dictates when aggregation is and is not allowed, going well
beyond AFR’s laxer relevance and publicity conditions. This reduces to a minimum
the need to resort to the intuitions of decision-makers to solve the conflict cases
opposing cost-effectiveness (or any other aggregative criterion, for that matter) to
any countervailing consideration, as in Daniels’s three paradigmatic conflicts. In all
such cases, the full acceptability condition itself offers specific answers.
Of course, many criteria that are used to allocate healthcare resources do not
involve aggregation, and they may conflict with one another. However, earlier in
this section we saw that, in virtue of the tight frame of reasoning that full
acceptability, but not relevance or transparency, imposes on decision-makers, full
acceptability leads to a commitment to assigning priority according to the strength
of individual claims. Consequently, a criterion should only be included in public
justification if it can be represented as providing the basis for the claims of affected
individuals to available resources. A hypothesis that seems worthy of future analysis
is that the full acceptability condition would also exclude several criteria that,
although not obviously aggregative, are nonetheless resistant to being represented as
bases for individual claims. Simply by browsing NICE’s list of relevant criteria as
described in the section ‘Daniels’s Model of Fair Process’, we come across the
principle that extra priority should be assigned to technologically innovative drugs
and the idea that drugs that stakeholders consider to be priorities should be given
extra importance, independent of the support offered to them by other criteria.
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Criteria like these seem to satisfy Daniels’s relevance while being impersonal in the
relevant sense, justifying further analysis that would seek confirmation that they
cannot be recast as bases for individual claims and, therefore, that they should
indeed be excluded from deliberation.
Given that fewer criteria create fewer opportunities for conflict, and fewer
conflicts lead to a decreased need for intuitive balancing, a shortened list of criteria
confines the use of intuitions within narrower limits. Although intuitions are far
from eliminated, detailed instructions regarding aggregation and a shorter list of
criteria than under AFR appear to reduce the volume of intuitive judgements
involved and, therefore, the risks associated with their being by nature closed to
public scrutiny.
Conclusion
In the previous section, I suggested that full acceptability seems worthy of attention.
From the perspective of this paper, however, the merits of full acceptability or any
other specific alternative to relevance are secondary; my main goal has been to
argue against AFR, demonstrating that we must search for a revised account of
fairness that somehow imposes stricter constraints on CEA and confines intuitions
within narrower limits.
Going back to the question asked by the title of this paper, it is not difficult to
understand why Daniels proposes a theory that has so much in common with the two
main critical targets of Rawls’s theory of justice. Certainly, it has not been my
intention to suggest that Daniels has not paid enough attention to Rawls’s
arguments. Rather, Daniels appears to be interested in providing a framework for
the allocation of resources by often unRawlsian actual persons, many of whom
place considerable weight on cost-effectiveness and take long lists of values to be
relevant to resource allocation. This interest is, of course, fully understandable.
However, by reconstructing Rawls’s arguments, and by bringing them closely to
bear on healthcare resource allocation, I have aimed to flesh out the full extent of the
damage suffered by AFR in the process of accommodating real-world tendencies.
Therefore, my conclusion is that Daniels has been too generous to such tendencies,
and that theorists should now put greater effort into understanding the direction in
which they should be reformed.
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